If one placed roofing on top of a portico that has doorposts, i.e., a portico with two parallel walls that are valid for a sukka, as well as posts in the corners supporting the portico and protruding like doorposts, which are considered as sealing the other two sides of the portico, it is a valid sukka. However, if he evened the doorposts by constructing walls adjacent to the existing walls, obscuring the posts so that they do not protrude, the sukka is invalid. This teaching indicates that the creation of a partition can cause prohibition.

Abaye said to him: In my opinion, with regard to that case of a portico, the sukka is valid. However, even according to your opinion, this is another instance of the removal of partitions. Evening the doorposts does not render the sukka invalid through the establishment of new partitions, but because it negates the original partitions of the sukka.

Rabba bar Rav Ḥanan said to Abaye: And didn’t we find that a partition causes prohibition? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to a house, half of which is roofed and half unroofed, if there are vines here, under the roofed section of the house, it is permitted to sow crops there, in the open section. The reason is that it is as though the edge of the roof descends to the ground and forms a partition between the two sections of the house.

And if he evened its roofing, by extending the roof to cover the entire house, it would be prohibited to sow other crops there. It is evident that the very placement of a partition, in this case a roof, causes prohibition. Abaye said to him: There too it is an instance of the removal of partitions. It is prohibited to sow not due to the added roofing; rather, it is prohibited due to the negation of the imaginary partition.

Rava sent a different proof to Abaye by means of Rav Shemaya bar Ze’eira, with regard to the same issue. And didn’t we find a partition causes prohibition? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita: There is an element in the partitions of a vineyard that causes leniency with regard to diverse kinds of seeds and an element that causes stringency. How so? With regard to a vineyard that is planted until the very base of a partition, one sows crops from the base of the other side of the partition onward. This is a leniency, as were there no partition there, he would be required to distance himself four cubits from the last vine and only then sow there. And this is an element in partitions of a vineyard that causes leniency.

And as for an element in partitions that causes stringency, how so? If the vineyard was distanced eleven cubits from a wall, one may not bring the seeds of other crops there, between the vineyard and the wall, and sow that area. This is a stringency, as were there no partition, it would suffice to distance himself four cubits from the last vine, and sow there. This is an element of partitions in a vineyard that causes stringency, a clear situation of a partition that causes prohibition.

Abaye said to him: And according to your reasoning that this presents a difficulty, raise an objection against our opinion from a mishna, rather than a less authoritative baraita, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to a clearing in a vineyard, Beit Shammai say: Its measure is twenty-four cubits, and Beit Hillel say: Sixteen cubits. With regard to the perimeter of a vineyard, Beit Shammai say: Sixteen cubits, and Beit Hillel say: Twelve cubits.

The mishna explains: And what is a clearing in a vineyard? It is referring to a vineyard whose middle section was laid bare of vines. If there are not sixteen cubits across in the clearing, one may not bring foreign seeds and sow them there, due to the Torah prohibition against sowing other crops in a vineyard (Deuteronomy 22:9). If there were sixteen cubits across in the clearing, one provides the vineyard with its requisite work area, i.e., four cubits along either side of the vines are left unsown to facilitate cultivation of the vines, and he sows the rest of the cleared area with foreign crops.

The mishna continues: What is the perimeter of a vineyard? It is the vacant area between the vineyard and the fence surrounding it. If there are not twelve cubits in that area, one may not bring foreign seeds and sow them there. If there are twelve cubits in that area, he provides the vineyard with its requisite work area, four cubits, and he sows the rest. However, were the vineyard not surrounded by a fence, all he would need to do is distance himself four cubits from the last vine. It is clear from this halakha that the partition causes prohibition.

Rather, the objection was not raised from there because there, isn’t this the reason that the partition is not considered to cause prohibition? It is because the entire area of four cubits alongside a vineyard is considered the vineyard’s work area, and is therefore an actual part of it. Likewise, with regard to the four cubits alongside the fence surrounding the vineyard, since they cannot easily be sown due to the wall, he renounces ownership over the area. With regard to the space in between, if it is four cubits, it is deemed significant in its own right, and if not, it is not significant and is nullified relative to the rest, and it is prohibited to sow there. A similar reasoning applies to the baraita. The stringency is not due to the fact that the partition causes prohibition, but because the partition impedes cultivation of the vineyard.

Rav Yehuda said: If there are three enclosures alongside one another, and the two outer ones protrude, i.e., they are wider than the middle one, so that there are partitions on both sides of the breach between them and the middle enclosure, and the middle one does not protrude, and there are no partitions between it and the outer enclosures, as it is totally breached, and there is one person in this one and one person in that one and yet another person in the third enclosure, the people in the enclosures are considered as though they are all living in one large enclosure. Consequently, the legal status of the group becomes like that of a caravan, and one provides them with all the space that they require. In other words, they may use the entire enclosure even if it is very large, just as there are no limits to the size of the enclosed area in which members of a caravan may carry.

However, if the middle enclosure protruded, and the two outer ones did not protrude, i.e., they were narrower than the middle enclosure, so that their entire width was breached into it, and there is one person in this one and one person in that one and yet another in the third, one provides them only an area of six beit se’a, in accordance with the halakha of individuals in a field, who may enclose an area of only two beit se’a per person. As the middle enclosure is larger than the two outer ones, it determines their status, in accordance with the principle stated above, not the other way around. Consequently, the person in the middle enclosure is regarded as though he established residence in only one of the outer enclosures, constituting a group of no more than two, which does not have the legal status of a caravan.

Based on these assumptions, a dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is one person in this outer enclosure, and one person in the other outer enclosure, and two people in the middle enclosure, what is the halakha? Is the ruling that if the pair exit to here, one of the outer enclosures, they are three people in one place, and if they exit to there, the other outer enclosure, they are three people in one place, and three people are considered a caravan and provided with all the space they require, as stated above?

Or perhaps, as one may exit to here and the other may exit to there, in which case there would be no more than two people in each enclosure, they are provided with only two beit se’a per person.

And if you say that one may exit to here and one may exit to there, if there were two people in this outer enclosure, and two people in that outer enclosure, and one person in the middle enclosure, what is the halakha? Is the ruling that here, certainly, if he exits to here they are three, and if he exits to there they are likewise three, and consequently they should be provided with all the space they require in any case? Or perhaps, in this case too there is uncertainty, as say that he might exit to here, and say that he might exit to there. As the direction in which he will leave his enclosure is undetermined, they should be provided with only two beit se’a each.

These dilemmas were essentially left unresolved, but the halakha is that these dilemmas are decided leniently, and they are provided with all the space they require in these cases.

Rav Ḥisda said: